Manitowoc, WI

Manitowoc, WI is a market of 81406 people where the decision frame is current level evidence rather than rent momentum. Zillow’s asking-rent index is $1,130 and its home-value index is $265,501 at 2026-06-30; the packet also reports a 5.11% gross yield. These are direct current benchmarks for a renter comparing advertised options or a landlord or small investor testing a simple price-rent relationship. Yet Zillow does not publish enough rent history here to calculate a trailing-12-month rent change. The 12-month rent change is therefore unavailable, and this report does not assign a score or rank. The central issue is not how Manitowoc compares with another market, but which local signals need clarification before a housing decision can rest on more than a single point in time.

Start with the Zillow relationship between values and asking rents. Zillow’s home-value index rose 4.92% year over year, while its asking-rent index supplies no matching trailing rent change. It is therefore possible to observe rising indexed values without knowing whether asking rents were rising, flat, or falling over a comparable period; none of those rent paths follows from a single rent level. The stated 5.11% gross yield is useful as a gross price-rent screen, but it is not a measure of operating income, financing, taxes, insurance, repairs, vacancy, or lease concessions. The evidence supports a narrow reading: indexed values and asking rents establish a current relationship, while rent momentum and net economics remain unmeasured. Their shared 2026-06-30 date strengthens a level comparison but does not create a trend record.

Census ACS places median household income at $69,148, with rent-to-income at 19.61% and price-to-income at 3.84. Those ratios define an affordability boundary using a market-level household-income measure; they do not establish the circumstances of any renter, purchaser, or housing type. HUD’s FY2026 two-bedroom Fair Market Rent is $973, compared with Zillow’s $1,130 asking-rent index. The Zillow level is $157 higher, or 16.2% above the HUD benchmark. That difference is meaningful precisely because the measures are not interchangeable: HUD Fair Market Rent is a program benchmark, while Zillow is an asking-rent index. Neither source identifies executed lease payments, concessions, bedroom mix beyond HUD’s stated benchmark, or affordability for households outside the Census median-income reference point.

The BLS LAUS measure shows metro employment down 1.85% in the 12 months through 2026-05. At the same time, the Census Building Permits Survey reports 236 permits in 2026 YTD through M06, including 88 permits in buildings with 5 or more units, or 37.3% of the total. The reported permitting rate is 2.9 per 1,000 people. Redfin’s 2026-05 snapshot adds a mixed resale-market reading: months of supply were 2.5 versus 1.9 previously, median days on market were 47 versus 53, sale-to-list was 98.36%, and price drops were 13.04% versus 10.33%. Higher months of supply and a larger price-drop share do not align neatly with shorter market time, but they measure different listing and sales conditions. Permits are authorizations rather than shown completions or available units. These BLS, Census Building Permits, and Redfin measures therefore describe a tension, not an explanation for it.

IRS county-to-county tax-return migration aggregated to the market shows 1480 moves in and 1481 moves out, for net migration of -1. Reported AGI associated with moves in was $57,180, compared with $55,162 for moves out, a gap of $2,018. The near-balanced movement count and positive AGI gap should remain separate observations: they do not establish a broad shift in renter demand, owner demand, tenure, or household composition. HMDA adds a different form of demand evidence. In 2024, HMDA records 858 purchase mortgages, including 91 investor purchases, for an investor share of 10.61%. That is evidence of investor participation among reported purchase mortgages, not a measure of cash acquisitions, all rental ownership, or every housing transaction. IRS and HMDA together show limited net movement and measurable mortgage-financed investor activity, without resolving how either translates into rental demand.

FEMA’s National Risk Index adds a market-wide risk dimension that should not be folded casually into the gross-yield figure. FEMA identifies inland flood, a water hazard, as the top hazard; the National Risk Index score is 68.9 and the climate-loss ratio is 0.000874. This is expected annual loss evidence at the stated market scope, not a property-level loss estimate or an insurance quote. The available cost-level anchors remain Zillow’s $265,501 home-value index, Zillow’s $1,130 asking-rent index, and HUD’s $973 two-bedroom Fair Market Rent. The packet provides no insurance premium, tax, utility, repair, maintenance, or flood-zone cost evidence. Consequently, the FEMA metric can establish that inland-flood exposure belongs in the market review, while it cannot convert the reported gross yield into a net-cost conclusion or determine risk for a particular address.

The decision-ready synthesis is a list of testable gaps rather than a buy, sell, rent, or rank conclusion. Zillow needs sufficient rent-history observations to determine whether the current $1,130 asking-rent level has a measurable trailing change and whether that index aligns with executed lease terms. The Census Building Permits and Redfin evidence needs a timing check between authorizations, completions, available inventory, price reductions, and market time. BLS labor change needs to remain separately dated from those housing indicators. IRS movement data and HMDA mortgage occupancy evidence need to be read within their scopes, especially because neither identifies all tenures or cash transactions. Finally, FEMA’s market-wide inland-flood signal must remain distinct from any site-specific flood documentation and cost record. The material tensions are rising Zillow values beside unavailable rent momentum, more permit authorization and supply beside shorter Redfin market time, and near-zero net migration beside an AGI gap and investor mortgage activity. None independently resolves the others.